The Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (the Committee) is charged with responding to requests by standard setters on issues related to financial reporting. The Committee is pleased to respond to the request for comment on the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Discussion Paper, "Shaping IASC for the Future" (hereafter the discussion paper). The opinions expressed in this letter reflect the views of the individuals on the Committee and not the views of the American Accounting Association.
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The Committee is pleased to respond to the request for comment on the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Discussion Paper, "Shaping IASC for the Future" (hereafter the discussion paper). The opinions expressed in this letter reflect the views of the individuals on the Committee and not the views of the American Accounting Association.
Our response to the IASC's discussion paper is presented in three sections. The first section outlines the context of the Committee's thinking. The second section lays out the Committee's views about desirable characteristics of a global financial reporting standard setter. The third section presents the Committee's specific responses to the questions posed in the discussion paper. 2 In developing these specific responses, the Committee was guided by the concepts and ideas laid out in section two of this response letter.
1 The Committee's agenda is shaped by the charge to respond to major FASB and IASC requests for comment. In preparing its comment letters, the Committee attempts to make the FASB and IASC aware of pertinent research. The Committee encourages all AAA members to submit comment letters directly to the FASB and IASC, and to bring pertinent research to the attention of the Committee by sending a one-page summary and a copy of the paper to the Committee chair, James M. Wahlen, Indiana University. The summary should include a clear statement of the research objective(s), the research methods and findings and the relation of the research to issues raised by the FASB or IASC. 2 For convenience, we repeat the IASC discussion paper questions or, in the case of lengthy questions, we provide excerpts.
CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW We support development of quality international accounting standards within the context of a sound conceptual framework because such standards would promote both business reporting that is comparable across companies and markets and the efficient allocation of capital in the world economy. Comparable reporting becomes critical as product and capital markets become increasingly global.
Obviously, quality standards require a standard setting body with the appropriate people and processes to create the standards and the legitimacy to ensure that the standards will be accepted. Restructuring the IASC is both timely and necessary. As indicated in the discussion paper, the current structure and process of the IASC require substantial reorganization and restructuring to improve both the quality of standards developed and the efficiency of the standard setting process.
However, the development of international accounting standards is not an end in itself, but rather is a means to achieve the goal of quality global financial reporting. Although they are an essential element of a sound financial reporting system, high quality accounting standards alone are not sufficient to ensure quality reporting; that outcome requires both quality accounting standards and a supporting infrastructure consisting of at least the following additional elements:
• Active oversight of a company's reporting by a strong board of directors or its audit committee • Regulators to oversee the reporting process with the power and staff to enforce the rules • Competent and educated management • Adequate technology for keeping accurate books and records • Competent and independent auditors • An appropriate mechanism for providing guidance in interpreting the accounting standards • Competent sell-side analysts and a free press to scrutinize financial reports • A culture supportive of healthy skepticism by corporate boards, auditors, regulators, analysts, and the business press
Research and anecdotal evidence suggest that the infrastructure quality, and thus the quality of reporting, differ substantially from country to country. For example, a recent report concludes that "Our experience shows that, due to the absence of appropriate enforcement mechanisms, enterprises in many countries ignore national or international standards and follow such accounting practices that suit their own purposes" (Rahman 1999, 30) . The IASC is seeking support for its standards from the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. In our view, that support must wait for three events:
1. Approval of a core group of accounting and reporting standards; 2. Restructuring of the IASC along the lines proposed in this letter; 3. Sufficient improvement in the reporting infrastructure of certain major countries to ensure that reporting would comply with international reporting standards.
High quality accounting standards are but one necessary component of a sound financial reporting system. They must be supported by an infrastructure with the elements described earlier in this letter. Without improvement in reporting infrastructure, quality international standards would give users of financial reporting the illusion of comparability and a false sense of comfort in financial statement reliability. Both are potentially more dangerous than the current state of reporting, where users understand that reporting is not comparable and may differ in reliability across jurisdictions.
DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GLOBAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARD SETTER
The Committee has developed a description of a global financial reporting standard setter, which we have used to assess the recommendations made in the discussion paper. Our description has eight elements. We believe that these elements combined will produce a standard setter with legitimacy , in the sense that the decisions of the standard setting body are accepted by its constituencies. In part, legitimacy is achieved by expertise, due process, representativeness, and the other elements listed below. However, one additional and essential component of legitimacy for a global financial reporting standard setting body is the agreement that securities regulators of affected jurisdictions will support and accept the decisions of the standard setting body.
1. Independence: the standard setter must be independent. The Committee does not propose to define independence for the purposes of this description; we offer the following indicia of independence. The voting members of the standard setting body, and the professional staff that supports those voting members, should be full-time paid employees of the standard setting body, with no ties to other organizations. The voting members of the standard setting body and the professional staff should not be responsible for seeking financial support for the standard setting body's activities. We believed that independence is undermined if any national standard setter is accorded decision rights on the global standard setting body by virtue of being a national standard setter. 2. Accountability: the standard setter must be accountable for serving the public interest. 3. Expertise: voting members of the standard setting body and the professional staff that supports them should be selected for their expertise. The Committee recognizes that various types of expertise should be represented among the voting members and the staff. 4. Representativeness: voting members of the standard setting body and the professional staff should reflect different perspectives on financial reporting and different sources of expertise. However, voting members and professional staff should not be viewed as analogous to elected or appointed officials who are expected to press the views of a particular constituency. 5. Due process: decisions of the standard setting body should be reached in meetings that are open to the public; exposure periods should be appropriate for the length, complexity, and importance of the document being exposed for public comment; decisions should be reached only after thorough consideration of all viewpoints and solutions; voting members of the standard setting body should be held accountable in the sense that each must explain the basis for his or her views; input should be actively sought from diverse constituencies. Due process may imply the existence of one or more advisory boards. 6. Alignment of authority and responsibility: tasks should be assigned so that persons or groups responsible for the successful completion of tasks should have authority over those tasks. One implication is that while input to decisions can and should be sought from many persons and groups, decision rights should be focused. 7. Sufficient resources: the standard setting body should have enough financial and other resources (e.g., full-time professional staff) to carry out its assigned tasks. Funding should come from a wide variety of sources so that the work of the standard setting body is not dependent on the goodwill of any particular group. 8. Operationality: the standard setting body should be operational in terms of size (the voting body must be small enough to operate as a decision-making group); location; funding. The structure of the standard setting body must support timely responses and efficiency in reaching decisions.
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE DISCUSSION PAPER
Our responses to the specific questions are guided by our views as expressed in the first two sections of this response letter.
Q1: Do you agree that it is important to focus the IASC's objectives more precisely as follows: (a) to develop International Accounting Standards that require high quality, transparent and comparable information which will help participants in capital markets and others to make economic decisions; and (b) to promote the use of International Accounting Standards by working with national standard setters to: (i) bring about convergence, for listed enterprises (i.e., enterprises with publicly traded equity or debt securities) and other economically significant enterprises, between national accounting standards and International Accounting Standards; and (ii) encourage national, regional, and international authorities to permit or require unlisted enterprises that, individually, are not economically significant to use those International Accounting Standards if those Standards meet the needs of users of the financial statements of such enterprises?
Question 1 pertains to the IASC's objectives. Subject to continued efforts to develop the financial reporting infrastructure described in section one of this letter, the Committee believes the primary focus of a global financial reporting standard setter should be the development and promulgation of high quality financial reporting standards. The Committee believes that advocating convergence (or, more generally, encouraging or discouraging specific behaviors of national standard setters) is not appropriate. Convergence between national standards and IAS is not in and of itself intrinsically desirable, because it leaves unspecified the quality of standards which form the basis for convergence. The Committee believes that promotion of international standards is best left to regulators, advisory boards, stock exchanges and others with an interest in well-functioning capital markets. Regulatory endorsement-an essential element of global financial reporting-is itself a powerful promotion device. Question 2 pertains to structure. The second section of this letter summarizes the Committee's views about the appropriate structure of a global financial reporting standard setter. We are not certain what is envisaged by a "partnership with national standard setters," but we emphasize that reliance on national standard setters for the technical and/or substantive work of developing financial reporting standards is not consistent with independence. Relations of the global standard setter with national standard setters should be (1) consistent with independence; (2) consistent with the needs and resources of the national standard setters; (3) based on shared assumptions about the function of financial reporting and of standard setting.
Q2: The
The IASC proposal calls for a Board with decision rights for the setting of accounting standards and describes how its members could be chosen. The Committee believes that an IASC Board should be purely advisory-not a decision maker as advocated in the discussion paper. An advisory Board would assist in obtaining the widest possible input to an independent standard setting process, tempered by concerns about the trade-offs between unmanageable size and representing as many constituencies as possible. The Committee believes that members of an advisory Board should be chosen because they have both interest and expertise in financial reporting and views as dysfunctional the notion that political representativeness should take precedence over expertise. The Committee emphasizes that an advisory Board should provide input and should not have decision rights over standard setting.
The appointment process to an IASC advisory Board should be the responsibility of trustees, with suggestions for appointments coming from many groups. The process should be based on agreed-upon criteria that emphasize expertise and independence. Diffusion of authority for appointments is inconsistent with Element 5 of the Committee's description of a standard setter-authority and responsibility should be aligned and decision rights should be focused. Question 3 lays out specific structural elements of a restructured IASC. We agree that there should be an identified group responsible for developing standards. We believe the group should embody the best available expertise and should be of a size and composition which support operationality as discussed in section two of this response letter. The proposed Standards Development Committee (SDC), which would operate something like a permanent Steering Committee, is not consistent with the Committee's description of a global standard setter. The proposed SDC would lack independence, resources, and focused decision rights which align responsibility with authority; the proposed SDC would be overseen by another body and its members would be paid employees of other bodies.
Q3: The Working Party's proposals address these key issues by the following changes: (a) a partnership with national standard setters-Steering
IASC Board responsibilities should not include final approval of standards developed by the SDC. Such approval would be either redundant (i.e., the Board would revisit the entire issue both technically and substantively, guided by the same conceptual framework used by the SDC) or the approval would be based on unknown criteria. Awarding decision rights to the IASC Board violates the ideas of independence, expertise, and operationality expressed in section two of this response letter.
The IASC Trustees are particularly important and present particularly complex issues, because of the supranational nature of the IASC. The IASC Trustees should act in the public interest and their members should represent primarily the public interest and not special interests. Securities regulators should be especially informed and vigilant about the composition, structure, and mechanisms for perpetuation of the Trustees. IASC Trustees should have responsibility and authority for appointments and fund raising. The appointment of delegates by Board members is not consistent with the alignment of responsibility and authority. The Trustees should monitor the operations of the standard setting body, but not the technical and substantive work of standard setting. The Trustees should hold the members of the standard setting body accountable for meeting agreed-upon objectives, which include independent, expert decision making, and the use of due process in reaching decisions. Trustees should represent various functions and interests related to financial reporting and the capital markets, including preparers, analysts/investors, attestors, academics, and stock exchanges. The Committee's proposals for changing the IASC's structure are driven by our description in section two of this response letter. Specifically, we propose eliminating the current IASC Board and replacing it with an advisory Board or Boards whose responsibilities are to provide broad input from many diverse constituencies; establishing an SDC that is small enough to be operational as a decision-making body and composed of independent experts with diverse perspectives. Question 4 pertains to the approval of standards. The Committee believes the discussion paper proposal is not consistent with independent standard setting or with an expertise model; it is not operational because it is overly complex and provides for too many layers of decisions. It does not align responsibility with authority.
Q4: The
The Committee's proposal is for an independent SDC to have responsibility for setting its agenda and developing standards, and decision rights for approving them. Our proposal meets the discussion paper's three considerations, as follows:
(1) convincing constituents that international standards will meet their needs is one of the functions of legitimacy. Our approach views securities regulators as a key constituency and advocates securing their support, before the fact, for the standard setter's process and decisions. The expertise model, independence and due process all provide for legitimacy. (2) our proposal will more easily attract qualified individuals because it aligns responsibility with authority. Our proposal emphasizes efficiency and operationality. (3) our proposal avoids the animosity and politicking that would surely arise if two competing bodies (the SDC and the Board) were asked to cooperate in the development and approval of standards. Under our proposal, the SDC would have decision rights and responsibility and the Board would be advisory.
The Committee recognizes the political element inherent in standard setting and believes that our proposal separates as much as possible the technical decisions of the standard setters from political influences. Question 6 concerns several aspects of due process. The Committee believes that due process, including seeking input from diverse constituencies, is an essential element of an international accounting standard setter. The Committee endorses elements (a) through (e) and elements (g) and (l) because they all contribute to due process. The Committee endorses element (f), the inclusion of dissents, as long as they are views of SDC members. The Committee endorses element (h), field tests, as long as they are properly designed and executed. The Committee endorses elements (i) and (j), which pertain to translations, as long as responsibility is aligned with authority. The translator must have the appropriate expertise and be under the oversight of the IASC and the IASC must retain control of the content-unauthorized translations should be disallowed under IOSCO agreements. The Committee endorses element (k), which pertains to comment periods, with the understanding that the SDC would choose comment periods of varying lengths depending on the nature of the document exposed. Question 7 pertains to implementation, enforcement, and training. The Committee does not believe a global standard setter should be reviewing national standards, advising national securities regulators, or identifying departures from its standards. Enforcement is a critical element of the infrastructure of financial reporting, but enforcement is not the job of the standard setter. Mixing enforcement with standard setting violates the standard setting mission, calls for a different type of expertise, and confuses two distinct elements of the financial reporting infrastructure.
Q7
The Committee believes that delivery of training sessions is not a core competency of a global standard setter. The development of implementation guidance and certain training materials are core competencies, as is a technical inquiry service as long as it is limited to standards and consistent with the implementation mission of the IASC. Question 8 pertains to funding. The Committee believes it would be foolish to ignore the lessons of the past in thinking about funding issues. It is not appropriate to proceed with reorganizing the IASC without fuller consideration of total costs and how the costs will be funded. The Committee believes it is inappropriate to rely on contributions in kind from national standard setters because doing so violates independence. The Committee supports the broadest possible financial support, with no dominant source, and with emphasis on those who benefit from the IASC's activities (which may suggest the sales of publications as a funding source).
Q8: The Working Party recognizes that funding is a vital issue and aims to develop

